SUMMARY: Much current literature argues that the Mexican revolution was not a revolution at all, but rather a series of rebellions that did not fundamentally alter the social order. Similarly, many scholars assert the changes in the Mexican work world during the Mexican revolution were the result of a paternalistic state rather than the product of the actions of workers. This article examines cotton textile workers* relationship to authority in the workplace during the most violent phase of Mexico's revolution, 1910Mexico's revolution, -1921. The results suggest that revolution indeed gripped the country, one that energized the country's still emerging factory proletariat. There is compelling evidence that millhands throughout Mexico continuously and successfully challenged the authority of owners and supervisors, fundamentally altering the social relations of work. It is this "hidden" revolution in the factories that explains changes in labor law, labor organization, and worker power in the immediate post-revolutionary period. The effectiveness of the workers' challenge to authority is what explains: 1) the new regime's need to unionize; 2) the development of pro-labor labor law after the revolution; 3) the power of unions after 1920. In short, workers' challenge to authority during the revolution is what explains the labor outcome of the revolution afterwards. 
It is not clear that the traditional labor histories have answered these questions. Most Mexican labor studies have focused on the state, union 1 federations or anarchist groups rather than the activities of workers themselves. Of these, the state has garnered the most attention. From Gonzalez Casanova's influential La Historia de la Close Obrera, which organizes Mexican labor history according to presidential sexenios, to Middlebrook's The Paradox of Revolution: Labor, the State, and Authoritarianism in Mexico, which tries to explain not the labor but rather the political regime, the state is seen as the principal cause of change in labor affairs in Mexican history. 13 That these studies and the much larger literature they represent have come to the conclusion that the state and not the Workers created the Mexican labor regime is not surprising. In Mexico, if you look for the state, you will find it. Salvador Novo, who lived through the country's revolution and reconstruction, commented that "In Mexico everything happens according to the spasmodic ejaculations of its politics." This leads us back to the dual problem of Mexico's industrial workers and Mexico's revolution. Much current literature would have us believe that a revolution took place in labor affairs without a revolution in the country and without the participation of workers themselves. It does so, however, without having studied the attitudes and behaviors of workers themselves. This article examines workers' relationship to authority in the workplace during the most violent phase of Mexico's revolution. Instead of looking at prominent radicals, labor unions and the state, it looks at individual and collective behaviors inside the factory. The Mexican revolution is not only a question of who ran the country but who ran the workplace.
The data from Mexican cotton textile factories suggest that revolution gripped the country, one that energized the country's still emerging industrial proletariat. It is this heretofore "hidden" revolution in the factories that explains changes in labor law, labor organization and worker power 16 Manuel Aguirre Berlanga, Revoluci6n y Reforma, Ginesis legal de la Revolucidn Constitucionalista (Mexico, 1918). 17 Gonzdlez Casanova, La Clase Obrera, Tomo 6; idem. En el Primer Gobierno Constitutional (1917-1920) (Mexico City, 1980), p. 12.
in the immediate post-revolutionary period. There is compelling evidence that the revolution: 1) emboldened the industrial working class; 2) radicalized workers; 3) strengthened the internal cohesion and solidarity of the class; and 4) contributed to building labor organizations. The revolution did this because of: 1) the breakdown of ruling class hegemony after Diaz fled the country; 2) a subsequent lack of effective repression, particularly between 1911 and 1916; and 3) an opening to workers* challenge to authority in the workplace through the early 1920s.
Despite the revolutionary attitudes and behaviors of Mexican industrial workers, their movement lacked the political organization that characterized later twentieth-century workers' revolutions. Instead of proclaiming a workers state, most laborers fought for: 1) better wages and working conditions; 2) more dignity in the workplace; and 3) the right to challenge authority in the factory. The ordinariness of this challenge has led many historians not to see revolution. However, the effectiveness of the workers' challenge to authority is what explains: 1) the new regime's need to unionize; 2) the development of pro-labor labor law after the revolution; 3) the power of workers after 1920. In short, workers' challenge to authority during the revolution is what explains the labor outcome of the revolution afterwards. In an act of revolutionary creation -since institutional memory was as short as the history of the industry itself -the workers' challenge from below led to a fundamental change in class relations in the workplace. The decade of violence from 1910 to 1920 emboldened Mexico's industrial working class, legitimated their questioning of workplace authority, and changed social relations inside the factory.
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In 1910 the most important factory industry in Mexico was cotton textiles. In this industry, archival sources suggest that workers revolutionized workplace social relations during the violent decade, 1910-1921. Far more than some literature would indicate, it now seems that changes in the formal rules and organizations that govern the workplace came about because of the revolutionary behavior of workers. In fact, there is some evidence that labor's challenge to authority combined with the breakdown of Porfirian hegemony to present an insurmountable challenge to Mexico's new political elites, a challenge the latter could solve only by making major concessions to workers themselves. If this is true, then a revision of the current historiography of Mexico's revolution is in order.
The conclusion must be that the legal Mexican work world improved because revolutionary workers demanded that it improve. They succeeded because a larger revolution broke the old hegemony. The larger revolution presented itself as a generalized challenge to authority in the countryside, in the city, in the state. Ultimately, the state was not only the armed men who took power at the top, but also the social relationships of work at the bottom. Only by understanding the attitudes and behaviors of workers and the change in workplace relationships can we comprehend the depth of Mexico's social revolution. Atl and Tannenbaum were not wrong.
Perhaps what led historians astray is that the theme had been difficult to study because the most important Mexican labor archives were mostly removed from scholars until Ruiz consulted the records of Madero's Labor Office. Since then, most analysts have continued to ignore workplace behaviors. Nonetheless, an examination of the records of the Labor Office, state governments, local archives in mill towns, and newspapers reveals a story different from the official one. In at least one industry, cotton textiles, a picture emerges of workers who challenged authority in the workplace as much as the campesinado challenged land tenure in the countryside. To understand this, one must use the documents to study workers rather than organizations.
THE COTTON TEXTILE INDUSTRY
In 1910 Mexico was a rural and agrarian world. What happened in the countryside influenced everybody. It was also a world ruled by cities and urban elites, some of whom understood that the country's future lay in its ability to modernize and industrialize. Although mining and oil generated more profits, the largest and most important factory industry in the country was the manufacture of cotton textiles (Table 1) .
Lucas Alaman, Esteban de Antunano, and Pedro Sainz de Baranda founded the Mexican cotton textile industry in the 1830s with mills in Puebla, Orizaba and the Yucatan. The first two became some of the country's leading textiles centers, joined later by Mexico City and Atlixco, a booming mill town south of Puebla. Early factories imported textile machinery, a continuing characteristic of the industry. Of particular importance were English machines; future industrialists would also import English wage scales and work rules.
By 1900 the country's 141 cotton textile factories employed 30,000 workers. At the onset of revolution in 1910, these millhands represented the most important factory proletariat in Mexico. They operated the country's most modern, large-scale factory industry. Many worked and lived in industrial zones, magnifying their strength.
19 Some of the establishments were large and modern, utilizing hydroelectric power and automatic looms, with more than 1,000 workers each. Atlixco and Orizaba were genuine mill towns in which a few large factories dominated local life. The plants often provided housing for the workers, creating Year  1900  1901  1902  1903  1904  1905  1906  1907  1908  1909  1910   1917  1918  1919  1920  1921  1922  1923  1924  1925   Factories  141  134  125  120  131  131  129  131  137  131  127   99  104  114  120  121  120  113  109  124   Looms  18,553  18,478  29,271  20,506  22,021  22,774  23,507  24, intensely working-class communities. In the large mills, the workforce was overwhelmingly male; women were relegated to lower-paying occupations, smaller factories, or associated industries such as cotton clothing.
Foreigners owned much of the industry. The French controlled some very large mills in Orizaba and Mexico City while Spaniards controlled many small and medium-sized mills in Puebla and Tlaxcala. Foreign technicians and managers, particularly Spaniards but also English and American, often ran the mills. Although the labor force was overwhelmingly Mexican, and even though many of the owners themselves were born in Mexico, there was a sense of foreignness to many of the enterprises.
Despite suffering serious economic dislocation during the revolution, the industry continued to operate. In 1910 there were 127 factories; in 1920 there were 120 establishments with almost 38,000 workers. By this time, the Mexican cotton textile industry had trained generations of workers, established authentic working-class communities, and created a genuine factory proletariat which had an understanding of itself as a factory proletariat. This was the core of working-class Mexico during the revolution.
LABOR CONFLICT IN THE MILLS DURING THE PORFIRIATO
Under the long Porfirian dictatorship, the textile industry grew, in number of factories and workers as well as productivity and output. The mills became larger and more capital intensive, importing increasingly sophisticated machinery. In some enterprises, the structure of ownership changed from individual or family-owned businesses to joint stock companies. The modernization of Mexican mills modernized the work process, labor relations and labor conflict. Large size led to increasingly impersonal labor relations while the factories themselves created ever larger, urban, working-class communities around them. Millhands, more and more recruited from working class rather than rural backgrounds, organized unions, demanded rights, and entered into conflict with management. In Las Huelgas Textiles en el Porfiriato, Mofses Gonzalez Navarro narrated a long history of capital-labor strife in the mills. 20 The conflicts culminated in the Rio Blanco strike of 1906, followed by the famous massacre of January 1907. The Rio Blanco workers were crushed, suffering some 50 to 70 dead. 21 Permanent labor organizations did not take root, workers did not win their rights and managers fired labor leaders at will. Subsequent studies confirm the basic picture of labor relations during the Porfiriato: industrial workers sometimes rebelled against owners and supervisors. However, they did not construct durable labor organizations, develop successful revolutionary parties, nor even make inroads in the legal system. In short, workers were weak.
22
Equally important, the daily challenges to authority in the factory were usually and regularly defeated. Although workers won some battles, they mostly lost because they lacked strength and organization, their methods and goals were often timid, and the owners could usually count on local and national authorities to repress the millhands if the demands seemed excessive. For example, in 1889 the owner of La Carolina, a large mill in Atlixco, reduced wages by a small amount. The workers elected a threeperson commission to speak with the owner. When the committee failed to convince management, the workers struck for two weeks. The factory then brought in strike-breakers accompanied by a group of rurales for protection. When one of the strikers attacked a scab, he was sent to prison for almost a year. The other strikers had to emigrate from the region to find work. La Carolina restored order because it was able to fire the rebelli- 20 Mofses Gonzdlez Navairo, Las Huelgas Textiles en el Porfiriato (Puebla, 1970 ous workers, replace them with strike-breakers, and count on the government and the armed forces to maintain order.
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During the great strike movement of 1906/1907, the same combination crushed the workers: dissidents lost their jobs, there were enough strikebreakers to replace the malcontents, and the rurales were there for the dirty work, which that year meant killing dozens at the Rio Blanco factory. By the end of 1909, textile workers did not enjoy the protection of written labor contracts, favorable labor laws, or strong national unions. Quite the contrary: their legal and political situation was almost as unfavorable as at the beginning of the Porfiriato. This is not to say that the struggles of the period were in vain. It is clear from the events of 1910-1912 that millhands had learned the value of solidarity, of organizing and of winning strikes. They had obviously mastered some of the techniques of fighting management and maintaining organization. They did not know enough to challenge owners supported by a strong government, but perhaps their knowledge would be sufficient to contest the workplace if the owners had only a weak regime behind them.
IN THE BEGINNING, 1910-1912
The Mexican revolution began slowly and fooled many. It started with a political revolution led by Francisco Madero, a wealthy landowner from the north and a member of the "decent classes". He did not challenge Porfirio Diaz, who had ruled since 1876, over questions of social justice or the nature of authority. 24 Madero wanted an opening of the political system for others like him, hardworking, prosperous, "decent folk". 25 Nonetheless, by successfully questioning the authority of the state, Madero legitimated the quest of workers and peasants to question the authority of their own dictators, bosses and landowners. In the countryside and in the city, many Mexicans asked themselves new questions, then responded with innovative answers. This was not foreseen at the beginning, however.
Upon taking office, Madero in effect completed his revolution. The dictator was gone. The country had only to prepare for democratic elections. Mexico could now enjoy "sufragio efectivo, no reeleccion". Unfortunately for the new president, however, Porfirio Diaz had done more than run dishonest elections. He also provided a combination of repression and concessions that effectively pacified Mexico. He supported wealthy elites while isolating rebelliousness from below. Now, with the old general gone, the ability of a new, unsure president to repress or negotiate was greatly more limited. Madero lacked the skill, the connections, perhaps even the capacity. In any case, the collapse of the Diaz presidency was also the collapse of the country's reigning hegemony. Discontent from below and collapse from above is the classic formula for revolution, leading to a deepening of the challenge to authority by the subaltern classes.
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Scholars from Tannenbaum to Knight have described the challenge from below in the countryside. 27 In the cotton textile mills, workers also sensed change and weakness above. will join them". 30 On 12 January peons in Lagos de Moreno, Jalisco, threatened a strike. 31 On 15 January 2,000 jornaleros from various ranches in Tlaxcala struck over wages and hours of work, 32 and on 17 January jornaleros in Guanajuato walked off the job. 33 While factory and rural workers organized unions and carried out strikes, in Morelos, with one border on Puebla and another on Mexico City, Zapatistas burned haciendas. 34 These were the multiple rebellions of Mexico's working classes, with a dangerous potential for linkage.
On 4 January the miners of Santa Eulalia, Chihuahua, walked out. 35 The panaderos of Chihuahua threatened to strike if the authorities did not stop prison laborers from producing competing products. Surrounded by conflict, the local government invited owners and workers to a meeting to implement rules on wages and hours of work.
36 Also on 4 January millhands at "La Experiencia" in Guadalajara walked out over wages and hours of work.
37 By mid-January, textile factories in Guanajuato, Hidalgo, Nayarit and Jalisco had joined the movement. 38 Two days later, a group of railroad workers struck, demanding the removal of their boss. 39 By early January 1912, Madero's government confronted armed revolution in the countryside, dangerous strikes in the cotton mills, and threatening workers in urban and rural industries.
Madero could not respond like Diaz; he lacked the experience, the networks, the power. In any case, it was not clear that striking workers would accept the kind of minor concessions Diaz would have offered, or that the new president had the influence to force millowners to provide concessions to workers. Furthermore, it would have been risky in the extreme to send in the troops; the army was already fighting Zapatistas dangerously near the Puebla textile factories -later in the revolution, Zapatistas would take control of Atlixco. To find a way out of this impasse, the government convoked a meeting of the textile owners on 20 January. That day the owners agreed to sign an accord that reduced the workday to ten hours while increasing wages by 10 per cent. Having won something, the strike leaders accepted a provisional return to work. Meanwhile, the owners established a commission to discuss wage uniformity and other industry issues. 40 In perhaps the most important settlement, everybody agreed that 44 Most important, it was a de facto industry-wide labor contract, the first of its kind in Mexico and a revolutionary breakthrough in Mexican labor relations. The industrialists then approved "la tarifa de hilados y tejidos", the new wage scale that guaranteed a minimum wage of not less than a peso a day.
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The industry-wide labor contract came on the heels of the overthrow of Porfirio Diaz, tension between the old army and the new president, uprisings in the countryside, the inability of the military to crush the Zapatistas quickly, a successful nationwide textile strike, provisional concessions to workers and a tripartite convention that forced millowners to talk with labor leaders. Mexico had changed indeed. Although some chose to ignore Even before the fall of Madero, textile owners recognized the threat to their domain. Two of them -the Gonzalez Cosio brothers -identified the problem. For two years the country had suffered the warfare that brought down Diaz and the subsequent intransigence of some of the rebels, notably those led by Zapata. Armed men in the countryside now seemed to determine national politics. In this ambiance of revolution, class violence and generalized challenge to authority, millworkers had begun to fight for control of the factory, thus threatening the very authority that capitalists needed to run the production process. Writing about the laborers in their "El Pilar" factory in San Martin Texmelucan, Puebla, the brothers noted that the workers' recent triumph -the 1911 strike and provisional settlement -so emboldened them that they no longer accepted counsel or punishment. They complained that when the factory tried to discipline millhands, even one who showed up drunk, his comrades supported him to the point of leaving the factory.
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Fellow factory owner Alberto Sanchez Vallejo also believed that workers were an undisciplined lot. He claimed to observe similar problems in his "La Sonrisa" factory. Millhands, he wrote, neither worked hard nor obeyed. They had bad habits which, instead of correcting, they worsened by sticking together stubbornly to defend their vices. His list of complaints was long: the workers drank too much, they came to work inebriated (which made sense if they drank too much), they would sneak into the bathrooms to smoke cigarettes, chat with comrades, and take naps. They often showed up late at the factory doors and left their posts early. They didn't clean or take care of the equipment; they even fell asleep on top of the machines. They wasted material. Whenever they felt like it, without any more restraint than a child, they threw a party -the infamous "fiestas" that made workers leave the factory despite being in the middle of an important task. 48 Although the complaints -foolish, undisciplined, drunken -were not new, the response was. During the Porfiriato, owners often griped about workers. Nonetheless, they had the ability to control them, to put them out of the factory, out of work if necessary. Now, after two years of revolution, Sanchez expressed the owners' frustration about the "effect of the triumph" on his laborers. Revolution emboldened workers at the same time it undermined the ability of the owners -through the state -to repress them. This indiscipline was therefore different and more dangerous than its Porflrian counterpart. The millhands had won a general strike in 1911 and a contract in 1912. The new indiscipline represented not only labor's protest but also its strength and its victories, victories born of revolution.
The absence of labor discipline bothered the manager of the large San Ildefonso plant near Mexico City. In June 1912 he wrote to the Labor Office to complain about the "fiestas". He noted that most religious holidays had been suppressed for some time, with notable exceptions that included the feast of Corpus Christi. Recently, however, the Church itself had minimized the importance of this holiday. As a consequence, the factory notified the workers that 6 June would be a regular workday with no time off for the customary celebration. The manager received no complaints when the millhands showed up at the factory that morning. After lunch, however, half of them neither returned to their posts nor advised the supervisor; they went to the fiesta.
The manager fired those who left their jobs without warning or justification. He was, he insisted, a reasonable man who treated his workers well. Nevertheless, he knew that if you "pampered" them, "authority would lose its prestige and then the work would depend on the will of the millhands, who would enter and leave the factory on their own, without any more law than their own caprice". 52 Clearly this was no way to run a factory or a society. The caprice of workers could never replace the solid good sense of the owners.
For the owners, the collapse of presidential hegemony strengthened rebellious elements inside the factories: successful strikes, widespread unionization and worker solidarity were now protected by a written contract. Unions, according to the proprietors, supported bad habits. Try to discipline one worker, they said, and the unions facilitated solidarity and weakened discipline. Sanchez Vallejo noted that if the factory tried to fire malcontents, it was often difficult to replace them. 33 This was clearly a period in which the owners longed for the days of yore, when authority received respect. 31 On 19 October 1914, Candido Aguilar, governor and military commander in Veracruz, issued Decree Number 11. It reduced the workday to nine hours, established overtime pay of 100 per cent for night work, made rest obligatory on Sundays and national holidays, forced owners to provide medical assistance and pay to injured workers, made rural mills responsible for maintaining primary schools for the children of mill families, determined that education in such schools would be non-religious, allowed the "juntas de administracion civil" or civil authorities to arbitrate conflicts between workers and owners, and prohibited the infamous "tiendas de raya". 55 Not incidentally, the mill town of Orizaba was located in Veracruz. If the revolution did not bring a soviet to power in Orizaba, it did bring workers' power to the fore. In a state filled with violence and contending armies, the revolution brought new men to power, men who owed their position to the revolution. Aguilar was one of them and he dramatically changed the legal parameters of the work world in his state. He did this because if he couldn't pacify Orizaba, he couldn't control his state.
Almost immediately, workers sought to implement Aguilar's decree, the state government to enforce it and owners to obstruct it. 56 In December 1914, the millhands of the large Cerritos mill wrote to Marcos Lopez Jime*nez, the new head of the Labor Office, complaining that the factory was not carrying out the terms of the 1912 contract. 57 Lopez Jimenez traveled to the mill town to investigate. He asked the workers in each department whether they had a union representative. When they responded that they did not, he then proceeded to help them elect union officers, tantamount to helping them organize a union. 58 The very next month the newly elected union officers, led by Jose Natividad Diaz, demanded that textile contract would not help them and that for workers to achieve their aims, "they would have to achieve them by bullets and not by laws".
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Although the Casa attracted the attention of many historians, it remains an open question the degree to which the institution exemplified the sentiments of ordinary workers. Despite its support of the conservative Carranza, the organization represented a left-wing alternative within a nascent labor movement that also included some tendencies further to the right. When Atl traveled to Orizaba, he found one local labor committee that opposed socialism and anarchism. The committee, headed by Enrique Hinojosa, expressed fears that Casa propaganda would undermine labor discipline. It nonetheless spoke of "a working class that has for a long time been abused and denigrated by the exploiters and the bad governments". 63 The left and the right of the labor movement thus agreed that workers constituted a class, one that was abused and denigrated by another class, the owners/exploiters and their governments. There is little doubt, therefore, that that is how many ordinary millhands viewed their world. Even the Labor Office used the phrase "the servitude of the Mexicans" to describe the condition of Orizaba workers. warning. They just didn't go to work. When management asked the union why the workers stayed out, it responded that since the San Lorenzo workers didn't work that day, they wouldn't either. It added that millhands didn't want to clean their machinery at the going rate; they preferred to leave the machines dirty rather than clean them for the low pay management was offering. The Mirafuentes workers combined solidarity (uniting with the San Lorenzo millhands), challenge to authority (refusing to clean the machines), and self-regard (walking out without warning). 67 On 8 February, Jose Natividad Diaz sent a letter to CIDOSA demanding a reduction of the workday to nine hours, 20 per cent and 30 per cent pay rises, and official recognition of his union. He argued that his petition was just, based on Aguilar's Decree Number 11, Article I. 68 The company neither accepted nor opposed the petition. Instead, it answered that Cerritos would cut the workday and raise wages if Puebla and Mexico City factories followed suit. Meanwhile, it agreed to an immediate though provisional 10 per cent pay raise. 69 The union refused to back off and ordered a slowdown in the factory, which led to immediate conflict inside the mill. 70 For both sides, the change in state power determined their positions, the workers using the governor's pro-labor decree, the owners hiding behind the federal government's national labor contract.
The unions now stood tough because the revolution weakened national authority while bringing new governors to power, some of whom were unwilling to crush labor organizations. A second conflict at Mirafuentes illustrated the nature of the problem. On 22 April Manuel Sanchez Martinez, the new union head, took advantage of Decree Number 11 to lead a commission to see the Nogales Municipal President. The members complained about "mal trato" on the part of department heads. 71 The municipal president then sent a letter to Joseph Taylor, who ran the factory, asking him to get the department heads to improve their behavior. 72 Taylor denied the workers' accusations, substituting his own charges that the millhands were no longer willing to "conform to [...] established customs" and that they now refused to clean the machines twice a week. The firing was in vain, however, as Diaz used his authority to protect Sanchez Martinez's position in the factory. 76 Taylor was furious. He fired off a letter to the Labor Office in which he denied the workers' accusations. He exclaimed that "to give in to the desires of the workers to fire directors [department heads] is to invite disorder and disaster, because without discipline and supporting them outside of any logic or proof, would make it impossible for us to work". 77 Taylor demanded respect for the authority of bosses; Nonetheless, Perez lost his job, Sanchez Martinez kept his, and the factory and the union signed an agreement which left the millhands with a new maestro with whom they were "muy contentos". 78 For these workers, the revolution meant that the factory could not fire them at will, could not bring the army in to repress them, and could not keep bosses they didn't like. The workers may not have invited "disorder and disaster", but whatever control they gained over the workplace was at the expense of management, which management understood.
For the next two years, labor conflict in the factories continued unabated. Revolutionary military commanders issued more labor decreesvirtual state labor laws -that conceded benefits to workers while restraining the threat to management. In early January 1916 General Salvador Alvarado, military commander and governor of the Yucatan, issued a decree with the preamble that "nobody has a right to extra while those that work lack the necessary". 79 The Yucatan labor code established an eight-hour day, a 2.00 peso minimum wage, and the right to organize.
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In late January General Aguilar promulgated another decree in Veracruz which legalized unions, establishing them as "the intermediary between workers and capitalists". It also required each union to register with the local government. The decree thus made unions necessary while implementing state regulation over their behavior. 81 Interviewed by reporters, Aguilar responded that his law would "strengthen the conquest of their liberties and rights that the Revolution owes them [. , . ] " . 8 2 In midFebruary Heriberto Jara, who replaced Aguilar as governor of Veracruz, issued his own decree, creating three arbitration commissions for labor conflict: a "consejo de explication", a "comite de conciliation" and a "tribunal de arbitraje".
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In Veracruz Aguilar and Jara legalized unions, but it was the revolution that gave them fire. Thus legalization decrees could not end conflict. Workers pressed forward, increasingly contesting wages. Piece-work, daily rates, overtime and other wage matters excited workers, sometimes exposing their feelings about class and authority. 84 time and Sunday work was inferior to regular work because the man was a paper pusher and therefore not competent to judge real workers. Class and hierarchy were at the center of the debate. A third worker reminded the assembly that Sundays were for "resting, cleaning up, and amusing oneself". If one worked that day, one would be denied the right to "rest peacefully at home". It was unjust for the factory to deny them 100 per cent overtime as compensation for their loss of recreation and the right to a home life. The revolution had made them feel like human beings! One union member concluded that it would be better for the millhands to refuse to work on Sundays if their conditions were not met. At the end of the speeches, his comrades agreed to refuse overtime if the factory turned down the demand for 100 per cent.
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The local labor board ruled against the workers, voting that Sundays and holidays merited only a 75 per cent premium. Maure immediately accepted. The union, however, did not. It then got the board to agree that workers could not be forced to work overtime; they exercised their rights by simply refusing to enter the factory on Sundays and holidays. 87 In this way, Candido Aguilar's and Heriberto Jara's labor boards protected workers even if they did not always rule in their favor.
Despite the defeat of political organizations such as the Casa, the years of revolution did not lessen workers' enthusiasm for their struggle; on the contrary, they grew in self-confidence and disdain for authority. In 1910 they watched Madero challenge Diaz. In 1911 they witnessed Zapata resist Madero. In 1913 they saw Huerta depose, then kill Madero. They observed a member of the landed class, Venustiano Carranza, challenge Huerta's presidential authority in the name of revolution; the Porfirian governor then allied with an ex-Porfirian bandit, Francisco Villa, to lead the resistance to authority. Huerta fell to the Constitutionalists, after which the Constitutionalists fell to fighting among themselves. "The struggle within the Mexican regime to restore its constitutionality had resulted in its destruction -the collapse of all the labyrinthine national, regional and local political and business deals developed over the previous 30 years [.. .]". 8 8 At each crucial moment, the working class learned from its rulers that authority no longer had to be taken for granted. If the ruling classes now decided authority by murder, why couldn't the working classes? Direct action in the factory, the local rebellion, became legitimate.
Meanwhile, the ability of workers to challenge authority had grown considerably since 1910, particularly with the rapid expansion of union membership. 89 The repressed proto-unions of the Porfiriato sprang to life after the fall of the dictatorship. Madero's Labor Office supported the 86 91 In Puebla, a new Confederation Nacional del Trabajo organized a meeting in November to press for wage increases; they obtained the support of the governor. 92 At the same time, Veracruz workers sent a commission to Mexico City to get the federal government to support gold equivalents for money wages.
93 Candido Aguilar, now the Minister of Foreign Relations, backed the commission, as did Jara. 94 A few days later, the millhands obtained an important victory as Mexico City authorized state governors to regulate a new wage system based on gold equivalents.
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On 18 November the military commander and governor of Mexico City, General Cesar Lopez de Lara issued regulations to protect workers' salaries. Three days later, the city's newspapers announced that "El Congreso Constituyente Inicia Sus Labores", as the Carrancistas met to draft a new constitution. 96 One of the powerful voices at the Constituyente was Candido Aguilar, who had written Veracruz's first labor decree. The Constituyente wrote a revolutionary constitution that also contained Article 123, one of the most progressive labor codes in Latin America, guaranteeing the rights to organize, to strike and to enjoy a minimum wage.
THE 1917 CONSTITUTION AND AFTER
The 1917 Constitution was a benchmark in Mexican history and labor affairs. Article 123 "gave both labor and capital the right to organize for the defense of their respective interests and allowed that the workers had the right to bargain collectively and go on strike". 97 when he discovered a weaver, Inocencio Chavez, away from his assigned post. In his report, Leautaud claims to have told Chavez to return to his loom. A half hour later he found the weaver in the factory's cleaning room, so he again ordered the not-so-innocent millhand to get back to work. Leautaud wrote that Inocencio responded with the sarcastic "no le daba gana hacer lo que se le ordenaba", to which the administrator threatened that if Chavez did not return to weaving, he would throw him out of the building. Angered, ChaVez pulled a knife and tried to stab Leautaud, who dodged the blade while delivering a blow to the rebellious worker. The Municipal Delegate, who happened to be in the factory at that moment, helped remove Chavez from the building. They failed to calm him, however. Inocencio continued to scream insults at the French administrator, challenging his manhood and asking him to step outside to settle the affair.
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In his report to Labor Department Inspector Francisco Sanchez de Tagle, Leautaud claimed that union officials were responsible for the agitation that followed Chavez's expulsion from the building. He said they gathered the other weavers to harangue them until a hundred "operarios" declared a strike at 10 a.m. that morning. Local authorities arrested Inocencio and jailed him, prompting the weavers to continue their strike for three days before returning to work, which union leaders Cecilio Napoles and Carlos Gonzalez opposed. They wanted to continue the strike until Chavez got his job back, even though he had attempted to murder the French factory administrator. Napoles was so angered by what he claimed was the weavers' lack of solidarity that he immediately resigned from the union and his job at the mill. Gonzalez returned to work with the others but resigned his union post. 106 Although the weavers did not win their job action, a three-day work stoppage to defend a comrade who was standing idly in the factory, who refused to obey orders, who tried to murder a supervisor, and who threatened the Frenchman's manhood, was symbolic of the attitudes of workers after a decade of revolution. Furthermore, after the three-day labor action, the protesting millhands recovered their jobs.
The spirit of revolution exhibited by the Santa Teresa workers traveled quickly from industrial zone to industrial zone and from factory to factory. Militant socialists, angry anarchists, confirmed unionists, determined organizers and disgruntled workers learned about activities in one factory and carried the news to the next. If one worker could get away with refusing an order, so could others. If one millhand could stab a boss, so could others. Radicals and militants and just plain gossips spread the news from region to region. Although the owners labeled all of them "agitadores de oficio" (professional agitators), they were the voice of revolution inside the factories.
According to Puebla millowners, the month of January was filled with outside agitators from neighboring Orizaba infiltrating their factories. In the mill at San Juan Amatlan, the owners claimed that "agitadores de oficio" had redoubled their "perverse" efforts to call factory meetings during the day, thereby disrupting work. Although the workers had formally agreed not to call meetings while at work, in late February they took an entire Friday afternoon to assemble inside the mill, effectively taking it over. The next day, as the second shift entered work, management claimed that there was a deliberate attempt to create tumult and anarchy. It accused workers of whistling, shouting and using the machines to create chaos. The factory administrator sent one of his trusted employees to restore order, a worker blocked his path, insulting the poor man. 107 The employee nonetheless insisted on obeying his superior, who came to his aid and ordered the workers out of the factory. At that point, he noticed eight or ten workers pinning the employee to the ground; one was about to stab him with a long knife. 108 In his report, the administrator noted that he shot a pistol into the air only in order to save the life of his employee. Meanwhile, Pedro Sosaalleged outside agitator from Orizaba and a member of the successful 1916 worker commission to Mexico City -led a group of workers in a knife assault on the administrator, who was wounded in the arm. One of the employees who tried to help him was stabbed in the back. The administrator defended himself in spite of his wound. This time he shot to kill, though only wounding one of the assailants. Freed from the grasp of his enemies, he ran to get a rifle, climbed to the roof of the factory, and started shooting below. The rebellious millhands fled from the building, though not before starting a fire which destroyed two of the looms. 109 When the police finally arrived, they made some arrests, leading to a workers' demonstration in the town. The owners claimed to hear chants of "Long live Free Russia", "Long Live the World Revolution", "Death to the Government", and "Death to the Gachupines". In front of the Palacio de Gobierno, orators delivered incendiary speeches that demanded the immediate liberty of jailed comrades and threatened to take matters into their own hands. 110 The owners were beside themselves with anger and indignation. In their letter to the governor of Puebla, they decried the rising tide of revolution inside the factories. Meanwhile, the local government not only released the jailed millhands, it then incarcerated the factory administrator. Said the owner of Ruiz Santibanez y Cfa, "the matter is extremely grave not only because of the absurd petition against Capital, not only because of strikes covered by a thin veneer of legality, but because of the eloquent demonstration of bolshevism, which, with an incendiary wick in one hand and the murderer's knife in another, they confront Public Authority, trampling, without any scruples, the principle of authority [.. . ] " .
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The letter to the governor reminded him that the workers' continued agitation not only threatened industry but also the state. Amatlan, it argued, was a case of "attempted arson, attempted murder, bodily damages, and attacks against the liberty of industry and work". It claimed that following the release of the agitators, somebody shot at the proprietors of the Amatlan factory as their car passed by the bridge near the mill. Furthermore, workers released from jail showed up at the factory drunk the next day, inciting their comrades to riot and spreading fear among the employees.
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Revolution and alcohol were indeed an explosive mix. On a Saturday in November, Luis Sosa, a weaver in La Constancia, came to work drunk, loudly demanding his weekly pay. The widow of Francisco Conde owned the factory and her employees refused to satisfy the noisy millhand. This infuriated Sosa, who began screaming epithets. The factory administrator tried to remove him from the building but the millhand pulled a knife and threatened the man, who answered by grabbing a pistol and clubbing Sosa on the head, then dragging him outside. The administrator returned to lecture the other workers that "people of this sort couldn't work there". He also warned them that their comrade had lost his job.
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The following morning union leaders were rebuffed when they asked management to readmit Sosa. The workers then walked out, demonstrating that Sosa's alcohol, knife and threatening words were perfectly acceptable to them, just as Inocencio Chavez's behavior had been acceptable to his comrades. 114 Furthermore, the defense of such behavior was important enough to convince many to lose work-time and pay over the issue. This indeed was revolution! The La Constancia strike indicated the fundamental transition that a decade of violence brought to the cotton textile industry. The challenge to authority was legitimate, and workers organized to defend themselves. They now used their organizations to strike in defense of knives, alcohol and fisticuffs. They were also willing to strike without warning, to unite with other workers, and to fight for control of hiring and them for only eight hours unless other haciendas did the same. Since that was not the case, those who would not work as before were fired. The campesinos asked the governor to invoke the new Constitution to help them keep their jobs. The letter carried twenty-nine signatures.
120 However, it was not only the constitution that emboldened these rural workers, but the strong union in the nearby mill.
If textile workers had the self-confidence to organize campesinos in surrounding communities, they also had the self-assurance to intervene more directly in the life of the factory. They were particularly interested in control over hiring. A union shop was a principal demand of textile workers throughout the country and the millhands of La Trinidad demonstrated that they would stop at nothing to control who worked in the factory.
On 20 included a job offer for Vazquez, the right to hold meetings and collect union dues inside the factory (without hiding in the bathrooms), changes in work assignments and procedures, and the assurance that no worker would be fired for participating in the strike movement. 123 126 As the strike progressed, union workers prevented non-union employees from entering the factory. 127 On 8 January 1921 the union finally agreed to go back to work. It only won from the Condes an agreement to reconsider the jobs of both Cortes and Vazquez. Although its victory was less than spectacular, the union was not crushed. Not only was it intact, its local and national alliances were stronger than ever. Furthermore, the federal Labor Office now confronted a violent strike at the State of Mexico's San Ildefonso plant, the use of dynamite by workers at the La Colmena mill, and an extension of labor conflict in Tlaxcala. 128 It is not clear that the Trinidad workers won the battle over Abundio Vazquez, but it was becoming more obvious that workers throughout Mexico were achieving significant control over factory life in Mexican cotton textile mills. By 1921 a decade of struggle had demonstrated to millhands that they could organize, strike and win. They could gain wage concessions, influence hiring and firing, change work rules and procedures, and stand up to the bosses. Now their caprice counted as much as the caprice of the owners. Authority still meant something inside the factory but now workers as well as owners exercised it. The Mexican revolution revolutionized social relations inside Mexican cotton textile factories. As the owners said about a general strike in August 1912, it was unjustified but "there only is a strike because some workers have 'espiritu revolucionario' ", 129 The "spirit of revolution" emanated from a social movement not initiated by textile workers, but one that nonetheless infected and energized them and led them to challenge the authority of owners. This challenge revolutionized the social relationships of hierarchy in Mexican mills, which in 1920 did not at all resemble their status in 1910.
CONCLUSION
In 1910, when the Porfiriato came to a violent end, the breakdown of hegemony inspired and galvanized industrial workers. In the cotton textile industry, millhands took advantage of the weakness in national government to challenge authority in the workplace. In 1911 they led a successful general strike, not against the old dictatorship but against the new regime. The result was, in 1912, an industry-wide contract. The new contract strengthened rather than lessened their struggle to win power in the factory, and provided heretofore non-existent protections. The tenacity of millhands and their willingness to fight for rights, for control, for defense of each other, were rewarded in 1917 with a constitution that contained more legal protections for workers than Mexico had ever seen. There was clearly an intimate link between the struggles of textile workers in Orizaba, the attempts of Veracruz governor Candido Aguilar to find a solution to the labor problem, and his role in creating Article 123, the new labor code. Meanwhile, the constitution did not slow the workers' struggle for power in the mills. By 1921 they succeeded in gaining government support for labor unions and virtual union shops everywhere. However, this was inevitable given the results of 1912: "the labor contract makes workers organized in unions even stronger", boasted a government publication in 1924.
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During the Porfiriato and revolution, the early labor associations were quite heroic. Labeled "agrupacwnes de resistencia" by the workers, the "resistance groups" battled long odds, opposition by owners and local caciques, and the mistrust of government officials. These organizations fought for better wages, improved working conditions and greater dignity in the workplace. They also fought for their own survival, always in doubt. Workers lacked a centralizing ideology, a political party of their own and even stable employment. Civil war made for difficult times in the factories. Nonetheless, during the revolution many factories unionized; it is difficult to find even a single case of permanent de-unionization. large mill in the core textile areas had at least one union, usually a powerful one.
With Alvaro Obregon president, the country boasted of a new constitution with strong protection for labor, a national labor confederation whose boss became the Minister of Industry, Commerce and Labor, and wellorganized, militant workers in the cotton textile mills. Throughout the 1920s this combination produced rising wages and better working conditions. Between 1919 and 1930 average wages in the mills almost doubled, from 1.70 pesos per day to 3.02.
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The revolutionary assault on workplace relations was not unique to Mexico. "During the 1905 and 1917 Revolutions in Russia, an attack by workers on foremen was an important feature of labor struggles."
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Clearly the Russian revolution was more worker driven and more worker directed than Mexico's. Nonetheless, an unappreciated aspect of Mexico's upheaval is the degree to which the revolution changed workers' behavior and, ultimately, the social relations of the Mexican factory.
Workers did not gain control over the workplace. Mexico did not become a soviet state. Furthermore, most analysts agree that many sectors of the working class lost control of their own unions in the 1920s. 133 This, however, is another and later story. From 1910 to 1921 a revolution challenged Mexico's industrial workers. The breakdown in national hegemony also collapsed the owners' hegemony in the factories. Millhands responded by challenging authority and ultimately creating a radically different laboring world in the post-revolutionary epoch, one characterized by progressive labor laws, powerful unions and strong rights for workers. 134 The Mexican revolution was not the Russian revolution, but it was more than rebellion.
The essence of class control is in the workplace. The Porfirian dictatorship was uniquely successful in supporting owners' control of modernizing factories. When national elites fell to fighting among themselves, the collapse of hegemony in the workplace became a by-product of the collapse of national hegemony. Millhands challenged authority at work. Their challenge was revolutionary because: 1) it wrested power from owners, transferring much to workers; 2) it led to permanent legal and organizational changes that strengthened workers' control; and 3) workers themselves restructured the social relations of work. The workers' revolution was limited, however, because ultimately it never coalesced into a political force that challenged the state. It cooperated with the new state, but the terms of cooperation ultimately subordinated workers. Workers won much, but the revisionists were right in arguing that the new state was not a workers* state. They were also wrong, however, in not seeing that workers wrought a revolution inside the factories without taking state power. The one-sided hierarchy of 1910 was replaced by a complex world in which workers, unions and labor leaders participated in the determination of hiring, firing, sanctions and, ultimately, control over the work process.
In comparing Mexican mills in 1921 with those same mills in 1910, nothing makes sense without Mexico's social revolution and the social revolution of workers. In 1910 workers could be killed by rurales, fired by the factories, disdained by administrators. Unions could be crushed while collective bargaining and labor contracts were distant dreams. In 1921 workers prevented the factories from firing them, sometimes killed supervisors, other times got rid of abusive foremen. Unions were powerful, collective bargaining the norm, and a national labor contract was the law. National and state labor laws, a federal labor office and local boards of conciliation and arbitration protected workers. Federal norms dictated piece-work rates and local working conditions, and these were enforced by workers and their unions. This was Atl's "greatest social revolution of our times". To millhands who lived through the revolution, it must have appeared that Atl was not entirely wrong.
